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Abstract 
For many British commentators, especially on the social democratic left, mid-century New 
Zealand, or at least its ‘settler’ population, was a society with much to admire – particularly 
in the field of social policy. British Labour Party leaders looked enviously at, for example, 
the Dominion’s 1938 Social Security Act, legislation which significantly added to the 
provision of state-backed health care and social security for New Zealanders. This was seen 
as building on earlier reforms which had established New Zealand’s reputation as a ‘social 
laboratory’, a key component of the Dominion’s sense of identity. In addition, the very fact of 
its Commonwealth membership made the potential transfer of its practices to the 
‘motherland’ all the more viable. New Zealand was thus a key participant in the transnational 
exchange of ideas about social welfare which characterized the era. But after the Second 
World War doubts began to spread, both inside and outside of New Zealand. These were 
focused on, for instance, a purportedly ossified political system and concerns over the 
absence of a broadly-based intellectual culture. From being a ‘social laboratory’ which could 
be fruitfully emulated, New Zealand became an example of a society in which a lack of 
vision and foresight could prove highly problematic. 
Keywords 
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‘The Land with the Midas Touch’:  British Perceptions of New Zealand, 1935-1979 
 
‘Practical colonists’: New Zealand’s long history as exemplar 
 
This article examines, first and foremost, the ways in which ideas about social reform and its 
practice in mid twentieth century New Zealand were adopted or adapted by British 
proponents of more ‘advanced’ social legislation. Building on the example of the country’s 
Liberal administrations in the early part of the twentieth century, the Dominion’s first Labour 
government, elected in 1935, proved instructive to the Labour Party in Britain, in the mid-
1930s an organization with little immediate hope of a return to government. Admiration 
became tempered in the post-war era, however, as an increasing perception developed, not 
least among academics and commentators both outside and inside New Zealand, that the 
country’s society had ‘stalled’ and that its historic role as a ‘social laboratory’ was in doubt.  
It is worth stressing too that, even when British perceptions were at their most positive, 
British commentators were for the most part concerned with the ‘settler’ population. 
The practical relationship between Britain and New Zealand had also begun to change 
by the 1960s with, on the one hand, the Dominion becoming more oriented to its Pacific 
neighbours and, on the other, Britain shedding Commonwealth links in search of closer 
European integration. As David Capie notes, although the bonds between the two countries 
were strong in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, nonetheless there was, for 
New Zealand, a ‘postwar shift from a Commonwealth to an American-led security order’. 
Throughout the 1950s and ‘60s, furthermore, there was an international shift in patterns of 
foreign investment, with the USA and Australia replacing London as a source of investment 
capital. Even more importantly, British demand for New Zealand agricultural produce 
markedly declined.1 Although New Zealand was again to play a role as exemplar by being 
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among the first countries radically to downsize its welfare ambitions from 1984, and with 
both societies continuing to pay attention to each other’s social policy reforms, by this time 
the close association between Britain and its previously closest Commonwealth ally had all 
but disappeared.2   
Perceptions of New Zealand were, until the mid-twentieth century, almost entirely 
benign. Miles Fairburn made clear in  The Ideal Society and its Enemies  both the reasons for 
New Zealand’s ‘arcadian image’ abroad, and the wide appeal of a land that in the nineteenth 
century seemed to offer both high wages and a peaceful refuge from the increasingly fraught 
labour relations prevailing in Europe. New Zealand was constantly depicted as a land of 
healthy climate and natural abundance; of wide-open spaces; plentiful land and labour 
shortages, boosting wages: in short, a country lacking in the acute status anxiety and class 
divides that were poisoning European politics. Employers and labourers were thought 
moderate in their demands; governance strong; crime low. The New Zealand Handbook of 
1888 promised workers ‘a comfortable living, a house in healthy surroundings, a fair start for 
their children, and a reasonable provision for their own future’.3 These were influential 
tropes. Many British journalists, politicians, civil servants and academics continued to visit 
and praise the country between the mid-1930s and the late 1970s, as indeed they had for 
several decades previously.  By so doing they continuously mounted imaginative re-
constructions of a country promoted by its elites as ‘God’s Own Country’ and a ‘land of 
eternal spring’, at least initially serving as a desirable model for social change back in the 
United Kingdom.4   
Here we will chart the course of this traffic in policy-orientated ideas, paying close 
attention to what D.T. Rodgers has termed the ‘narratives and social fictions’ that help 
determine why some policies make it across borders, and some do not.5 Such work has a 
venerable pedigree, for historians have long noted how New Zealand was often seen as a 
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‘social laboratory’ in late nineteenth-century Britain.6 And as Marian Sawer has shown, in the 
era before the First World War reform-minded governments in New Zealand, Australia, and 
Britain drew on a ‘common fund of social research and policy discourse’. This enabled these 
administrations to utilize ‘successful precedents’ from elsewhere, and especially from within 
the British Empire. In turn, this ‘helped reduce the risk of such reform, both for the public 
and for the proponents’.7 Peter Coleman has further shown that New Zealand’s social policies 
had a significant impact in the USA.8 
One embodiment of New Zealand’s manifold influence in the outside world was the 
country’s Agent-General in Britain, William Pember Reeves. As Tony Ballantyne has 
pointed out, Reeves’ cultured nationalism helped to create one part of New Zealand’s 
dominant national image abroad: of a ‘progressive’, stable, orderly country of settlers which 
had brought its racial conflicts between Europeans and Maori to an end.9 Giselle Byrnes has 
observed that  Reeves’ 1898 book, Aotearoa: Long White Cloud, marked a shift in 
‘perspective and style’ in New Zealand history emphasizing, inter alia, the colony’s leading 
role in ‘women’s suffrage, labour emancipation and social innovation’.10 Pember Reeves 
served as a reforming Liberal minister before moving to London. There he became a leading 
Fabian and close associate of Sidney and Beatrice Webb before becoming Director of the 
London School of Economics. In the latter post he preceded another ‘progressive’ social 
reformer with a pronounced interest in New Zealand’s welfare policy, William Beveridge.  
Beveridge was to visit the Dominion in 1948 when, as Margaret Tennant notes, he was 
‘honoured as the father of Britain’s welfare state’. In the course of this visit Beveridge 
stressed the importance of voluntarism in welfare provision and, as Tennant further remarks, 
his ideas were ‘subsequently mediated by at least one prominent public servant, John Robson, 
who used public resources to encourage voluntary bodies to experiment in areas where the 
state had to tread warily, if at all’.11 New Zealand’s influence was not, furthermore, confined 
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to Pember Reeves’ work. British women’s suffrage campaigners often cited New Zealand as 
a model of democratic progress after it became the first state to include women in the 
franchise at the start of Richard Seddon’s long Liberal Premiership between 1893 and 1906. 
Kate Shepherd, the New Zealand suffrage campaign’s leader, toured Britain in 1894-95, 1903 
and 1908 – causing Quaker activist Mary Priestman to argue that ‘scarcely anything does 
more good to women’s suffrage in England than seeing those who speak from personal 
experience’.12  
Many of these ideas became an international intellectual currency, criss-crossing 
oceans and continents.13 In Britain New Zealand was perceived as an exemplar of peaceful 
and ordered progress – still a highly problematical, and deeply questionable view of its 
exceptionalism that ignored the way in which Australian, British and American culture and 
presumptions all helped to shape New Zealand’s Pākehā (that is, European) society. In the 
second half of the twentieth century New Zealanders generally watched American films and 
listened to American radio shows and took many of their more progressive educational ideas 
from the same source.14 Much of New Zealand’s political language itself naturally came from 
the United Kingdom, but other additions – for instance the idea of a party ‘caucus’ – were 
imported from the USA.15 This multi-dimensional traffic in ideas extended to legislation. The 
country’s Physical Welfare and Recreation Act, passed in 1937, both followed on from and 
mirrored very similar British legislation of just a few months before.16 
 It was as usual for the colonies to copy (or reject) British institutions and plans as it 
was for policy exchange to happen in the other direction: Tennant’s detailed history of 
voluntary organizations in New Zealand admirably demonstrates just how deep and long-
lasting was the influence of the metropolitan, and then the ex-colonial, power. A new 
European settlement, with less philanthropic endowment and activity than Britain enjoyed, 
felt the conscious need to set up stronger regulations in deliberate contradistinction to 
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Britain’s, for instance in the care of children under the Infant Life Protection Acts of 1893 
and 1896. In many such sectors, such as social work, prison reform and marriage guidance, 
New Zealand’s policies were often very deeply influenced by the British example.17  
 New Zealand was often evoked within British policy discourse, negatively as well as 
positively – a dominance it enjoyed in part because it seemed to offer a complete case study 
of social progress with easy-to-summate explanations immediately provided by its history 
and political provenance. New Zealand’s influence on policy development has hardly gone 
unheeded – indeed Andrew Dilley has recently pointed out how important the country was in 
Australian Labor’s adoption of a graduated land tax, and its passage into law in 1910.18 Here 
we seek to cast new light on the scale and scope of New Zealand’s influence on welfare 
policy – both more specifically in the UK, and rather later in the development of relations 
between the two countries, than has usually been addressed by previous historians. 
Such reverberations have not been too hard to find. The British-born American social 
scientist Leslie Lipson, who served as the first Professor of Political Science at Victoria 
University of Wellington between 1939 and 1946, noted wryly in 1948 that the claim that 
New Zealand ‘leads the world’ had been widespread since at least the 1890s.19 It was a 
colony, and then a state, often thought of as having been ‘born modern’ – created at the very 
end of European colonization, and sited geographically at the limits of Europeans’ political 
reach, it was a place where the previous economic and social mistakes made in Europe itself, 
and in the Americas, had not been repeated.20 The country was, in the words of New Zealand 
Herald editor and radical imperialist William Lane, a ‘better Britain’, perceived as taking the 
best racial stock and ideas from the metropole and planting them in more fertile soil.21 This 
idea of a ‘better Britain’ built on Charles Dilke’s mid-nineteenth century notion of a ‘Greater 
Britain’; an idea that had a long shelf-life.22 It was also to be crucial in the acceptance of New 




‘An act of faith’: the programmatic welfare state? 
 
One of New Zealand’s hallmarks had always been the perception that it enjoyed a wide 
measure of social equality. Many mid-century British commentators agreed. Future Labour 
Chancellor Hugh Dalton, who visited Australia and New Zealand in 1938, recorded in his 
diary: ‘How much more worth defending are these sunny, healthy British democracies in the 
South Pacific than the Counting Houses of the City of London, or the Snob Home Counties, 
or the Slums of Glasgow’.23 Dalton elaborated further in the notes for his diary where he 
argued that Australians’ and New Zealanders’ good health was attributable to ‘the high 
standard of living and the absence of mass poverty which disfigures older lands’.24 This 
contrast between the ‘new’ and ‘younger’ countries and the older and more class-bound 
mother country was a recurring theme, playing as it did into the notion that New Zealand was 
a ‘better Britain’ while the motherland was beset with problems. 
As economic depression gripped the capitalist economies in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, New Zealand’s welfare system, both voluntary and state, continued to speak to the rest 
of the world. In 1930 the mayor of Wellington claimed that, along with the All Blacks and 
the country’s military, the internationally renowned voluntary infant welfare organization, the 
Plunket Society, had ‘advertised’ the Dominion.25 In 1938, New Zealand’s Social Security 
Act became one of the most-examined pieces of legislation in the world.26 But it was a 
measure that came as no surprise to policymakers aware of the Dominion’s path-breaking 
efforts. In return for a special tax on all incomes, non-means tested pensions for the over-65s, 
universal health care, family allowances and sickness benefits were set up which many New 
Zealanders believed, reasonably enough, to be the envy of the world. Though means testing 
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remained for younger pensioners, and on most other allowances, they were not particularly 
fiercely applied.27  
The Social Security Act stood, for many years, as the acme of progressive generosity. 
David Goldblatt, a longstanding British Liberal Party campaigner and candidate, visited New 
Zealand in 1955, returning on several subsequent occasions, and published a short but 
revealing survey of the Dominion in 1957.28 His impressions were, at least superficially, 
extremely positive. The Dominion was, for Goldblatt, the ‘Land with the Midas Touch’ 
which could be seen as ‘“Merrie England” with electricity’. New Zealand had led the world 
in combatting poverty and was forever expanding its social security provision.29 Alongside 
the Pensions Amendment Act which increased state pensions (especially for widows), it was 
Social Security that burnished New Zealand’s image as a practical utopia. Goldbatt argued 
that the scheme, ‘in its spirit of human kindness’, showed precisely the ‘the generosity and 
sense of communal decency that are the pride and mark of New Zealand’. As such it 
demonstrated a commitment to the country’s ‘resources, wealth, determination and future’, 
defined in terms of its human capital. Long before Lyndon Johnson employed the phrase in 
1960s America, here was ‘a declaration of war against want and poverty’ and an expression 
of social solidarity and social responsibility. Goldblatt saw New Zealand’s Social Security 
system as an example of how blessed the country really was: a ‘thanksgiving’ for the happy 
life in ‘God’s Own Country’.30 
The Act’s social security and health provisions were closely studied by the British 
Labour Party and provided crucial ammunition in its case for social reconstruction.  As 
Stephen Brooke has argued, when in the early 1940s Labour was preparing its welfare 
proposals for post-war Britain, and doing so ahead of Beveridge, ‘one of the models’ for a 
universal and comprehensive scheme of social insurance was ‘New Zealand’s Social Security 
Act of 1938’.31 Equally, the struggle between New Zealand’s Labour government and the 
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Dominion’s branch of the British Medical Association was followed carefully by both 
medical leaders in Britain and that country’s Labour Party, and prefigured the conflict 
attending the post-war Labour government’s introduction of the National Health Service 
(NHS).32 The Minister of Health in the post-war Labour government, Aneurin Bevan, was 
later to recall the ‘collective arrogance’ displayed by the medical profession in Britain, New 
Zealand, and Australia.33 In 1944 – and so at the height of debates over post-war 
‘reconstruction’ – the British Labour Party published a pamphlet by the 1930s New Zealand 
Finance Minister, and later Prime Minister, Walter Nash, revealingly entitled Social 
Progress. He argued that taken together, old age, widows’, family and maternity benefits 
constituted a guide to a very Labourist philosophy. For here, in this scheme of social security, 
was recognition that ‘the first charge on a nation’s wealth should be the care of the old, the 
young, and the ailing’. National resources should be organized to ‘ensure the maximum 
production of useful goods and services and their availability to all. Collective planning is 
essential’.34 Martyn Finlay, in the 1970s to become Labour’s Attorney General, wrote 
similarly in 1943 that collectively national superannuation, accident and health benefits were 
a rebuttal of fascism itself: ‘Hitler fashioned a highly effective machine on the principle of 
Guns or Butter. Social Security aims at maintaining the family and improving its living 
conditions. Through it we can do a far better job, on the principle of Homes – and Butter’.35 
It is worth emphasizing that interest in the New Zealand Labour government’s social 
reforms was not simply confined to Britain’s labour movement.  In 1937 Nash had written a 
piece for the New Fabian Research Bureau on ‘Labour Rule in New Zealand’. But this also 
appeared at the same time in The New Outlook, the journal of the Next Five Years Group, a 
more broadly-based body representing generally ‘progressive’ opinion and part of the 1930s 
vogue for ‘planning’.36 Here Nash outlined his government’s achievements after its first year 
in office: concluding, and in a reference to contemporary international tensions, he suggested 
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that ‘collective security’ was as ‘imperative for individuals as for nations’. In a further 
gesture to New Zealand’s pioneering social welfare system he claimed that once the 
Dominion had put ‘our own house in order’ it could then help ‘to raise the standard of living 
in all countries’.37 
Indeed, the 1938 Act found supporters in Britain from all parts of the political 
spectrum – though Labour politicians seemed to assume rather than promote the example.  
During the debates on the Beveridge Report Lord Bledisloe, Conservative peer and former 
Governor General of New Zealand, observed that while some of his fellow peers viewed the 
Dominion ‘with suspicion’ they would be well-advised to look at its recently inaugurated 
social security system. Bledisloe’s own, rather unusual, take on this was that the scheme 
‘made it perfectly clear’ that New Zealanders would not ‘tolerate idleness on the part of 
anyone, to whatever class of the community he might belong’.38 In the Commons, 
meanwhile, the eccentric Independent MP Denis Kendall suggested he and his constituents, 
irrespective of political opinion, had accepted that reform of social insurance was required.  
He also reported that it had been said that ‘if New Zealand, one of our smallest Dominions, 
can have a scheme of social security, this country, which is the heart and hub of the Empire, 
should be well able to afford such a scheme’.39 
A peculiar, particular mix of intervention and self-reliance was often thought to 
emanate from New Zealand’s very history. As an isolated farming society, the country was 
said to attract the hard-working and the self-reliant. An early twentieth century school 
textbook rendered the point thus: ‘the successful colonist must be of sturdy character, 
preserving, unflinching in the face of difficulty, steady of nerve… and not too proud to labour 
with his own hands; he must love the land, as the old Teuton forefathers of the English loved 
it’.40 New Zealand emerged into national consciousness, and then statehood, in an era when 
the balance between the individual and the reforming state was a matter of intense debate, 
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and its citizens were acutely aware of how governments might facilitate both economic 
growth and any social gains this might secure. Goldblatt combined both these arguments, 
suggesting that in New Zealand the welfare state was ‘the modern extension of its previous 
way of life’. It emerged from the process whereby ‘the settlement had drawn upon its 
resources, first in family, and then in community, to shield its less fortunate’. This approach 
‘needed no theory as mainspring, for it grew out of circumstance and environment’. Older 
colonies had been founded by those fleeing religious or political persecution, but migrants 
came to New Zealand seeking a materially better life through hard work and long-term 
investment. ‘Private endeavour’ there took place in ‘the context of communal knowledge and 
consent’; an assessment that along with most other British observers ignored the 
dispossession of Māori. Economic improvement was in Goldblatt’s view both an individual 
and communal aim: hence social reform was ‘in everyone’s mind; the Welfare State was in 
embryo’.41  
 
‘Blazing new trails’: Labour’s New Zealand breakthrough, 1935-1949 
 
Welcoming the election of the first Labour government in New Zealand, the journal of one of 
Britain’s most powerful trades unions, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), 
saw it as ‘a clear mandate to the [British] Labour Party to proceed with its plans for economic 
reconstruction and social justice’. Reiterating a persistent theme, it suggested that Labour’s 
victory in New Zealand was a ‘splendid example from a young country to an old, of the 
translation into political action of the corporate impulse towards a new social order’.42 In 
1938 the New Zealand government’s London office supplied the British Labour Party’s 
International Department with details of the 1938 Social Security Act, then before the 
Dominion’s parliament, and a copy of the budget. These had been specifically requested by 
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the International Department.43 Dalton, in an article on his trip, noted that ‘in politics New 
Zealand is pioneering again’. Having led the world in women’s suffrage, old age pensions, 
and industrial arbitration the country was now ‘blazing new trails’ through, for example, a 
‘Pensions and Health Scheme more generous in its benefits than any in the world’.44   
Ernest Bevin, Britain’s leading trades unionist and head of the TGWU, also visited 
New Zealand in 1938 where, according to his biographer, the labour movement gave him ‘a 
great reception’. Bevin later recounted the trip in his union’s journal, describing the New 
Zealand government’s social security proposals as ‘the boldest that any country of that size 
has ever undertaken’. As such it deserved ‘all the support we can possibly give it in this 
country’.45 Bevin consequently deprecated the hostility of British business and finance to the 
Dominion’s currency policy, not least because this could be ‘injurious to the maintenance of 
the Commonwealth’.46 Such was his commitment that he invested £110,000 of his union’s 
funds when New Zealand’s stocks fell in the wake of Labour’s 1938 election victory, in part 
because of UK financial policy.47 And around the same time Douglas Jay, one of the Labour 
Party’s earliest converts to Keynsianism, saw New Zealand as one of those ‘civilized 
countries’ which had ‘established State control over their central banks in the last few years’.  
Like Scandinavia and Australia, the Dominion had also undertaken more redistribution of 
wealth with ‘very great success’, for example through the imposition of ‘large increases in 
taxation on unearned income and inheritance’ at the same point at which it had nationalized 
its central bank and reduced working hours. All this had occurred, Jay claimed, at no cost to 
economic recovery.48  
Of course, there were other viewpoints. The UK High Commissioner to New Zealand, 
Sir Harry Batterbee, told his superiors in London in 1939 that the relationship between the 
Dominion’s main political parties was at such a low point that it posed a danger to the 
country, and that the ‘same bitterness’ existed between the Labour Party and the ‘professional 
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and commercial classes’.49 Nonetheless, as discussions around plans for post-war 
reconstruction got underway in the early 1940s, New Zealand was again a frequently cited 
example of what could be achieved by a Labour administration. The Labour economist Evan 
Durbin argued that the New Zealand government was among those seeking to replace laissez-
faire capitalism with ‘institutions guaranteeing a central control of industry and broad 
measure of social equality.50 Future British Cabinet Minister John Strachey, meanwhile, 
wrote in 1940 that, like the Swedish Social Democrats, New Zealand Labour had reconciled 
full employment with increased living standards, and that this gave them ‘their superior 
position’.51 A Labour Party discussion document produced partly for post-war planning in 
1942 noted that New Zealand’s 1938 Act ‘applies to every inhabitant of New Zealand 
without distinction of age, sex or occupation’ and that it was in these terms, as well as in 
terms of content, ‘a bold and constructive Act’.52  
The welfare reforms inaugurated by New Zealand Labour in power were in the first 
half of the twentieth century thought to be the country’s most specific and important 
characteristic. New Zealand Labour leaders were convinced that these reforms deserved such 
general significance. In a work published during the Second World War Nash entitled one 
Chapter ‘Why We Fight’. The war, he insisted, must be fought ‘for positive ends’. Despite 
the hardships experienced by the Dominion’s military, every soldier had experienced ‘good 
schooling, ample work’ and the confident expectation of ‘a fair share of the goods produced 
by that work’ in his country. He had also enjoyed ‘a social security system guaranteeing to 
every citizen freedom from both the fact and fear of poverty, old age, ill health, and the other 
fears of insecurity which haunt the ordinary man and woman almost every day’. 
Consequently, New Zealand’s fighting men had before them ‘the vision of better things to 
come’. Pressing the point home, Nash stressed the importance of self-help in New Zealand 
society. But that did not mean that social obligations were neglected – on the contrary. The 
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principles which guided New Zealand society had been incorporated in legislation, ‘in what is 
called the Social Security Act’. The government realised ‘more completely, perhaps, than has 
been recognized anywhere else, the need for the community, as a whole, to accept 
responsibility directly for the economic welfare of its members, that against the hazards 
incidental to the competitive struggle for private gain must be set the need for collective 
organization of security’. The outcome of the war, then, should be a ‘people’s peace’ which 
must be a ‘battle for an all-in security for all’.53 This was not a matter of Nash simply talking 
to his fellow New Zealanders, for the work was published in both the USA and Britain. Like 
others, he was drawing attention to the Dominion’s role in promoting social reform. In 
forming his ideas Nash and others in the Labour party drew heavily on ‘Hobson, Keynes and 
other English Liberals’ and Nash brought with him, from his native English Midlands, a 
strong sense of Christian Socialism.54 
Even with Labour out office in New Zealand after 1949, the Dominion continued to attract 
the attention of British commentators. In 1951, British Labour was highly critical of what 
happened after the National Party’s election victory in New Zealand.  Policies directly 
affecting ordinary New Zealanders included the removal of food subsidies and price controls, 
with consequent price rises for foodstuffs such as bread and tea.55 The Fabian political 
theorist G.D.H. Cole drew especial attention to New Zealand’s rising birth rate, and declining 
death rate, when he reviewed the British welfare state in 1956 – developments in his view 
that reflected unfavourably on Britain’s poor record in both areas.56 One general guide to the 
country, published in the later 1960s, remarked on ‘the most comprehensive welfare system 
to be found anywhere in the world at that time…unique in the range of the benefits it 
provided and for the sweeping powers of paternalism which it took to itself’. Inflation was 
the main problem that such a small and isolated country might face under conditions of full 
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employment and relatively high benefits: this was soaked up, in the approved Keynesian 
manner, via high personal taxation.57  
The New Zealand-born Stanford economist John Bell Condliffe reflected on his 
country’s recent history in his 1959 book The Welfare State in New Zealand, written after a 
1957 visit to his native land. Making the familiar point about New Zealanders’ purported 
pragmatism, he suggested that if they had ‘any dominant theory of social and economic 
organization, it is that economic prosperity must rest upon and promote human welfare’. 
Condliffe, again oblivious to New Zealand’s politics of dispossession, believed that this 
concept originated with the first settlers, rejecting the dominance of both Tory paternalism 
and the inception of laissez-faire occurring in Britain at the time New Zealand came into 
being as a consciously separate entity. A lack of long-established voluntary bodies had 
necessitated state action against poverty, particularly in the economic crises of the 1890s and 
1930s. This ‘well-governed and law-abiding community’, moreover, trusted its governors and 
courts enough to feel loyal to their decisions.58  
 
Socialism or Labourism? 
 
For many years, most in the British Labour movement had no doubt that socialism was being 
introduced in New Zealand. So, for instance, a 1937 Labour Party pamphlet, New Zealand’s 
Progress Under Socialism, observed that plans were in place for ‘comprehensive health 
insurance, unemployment insurance and national superannuation schemes to cover every 
citizen of the Dominion’.59 Noting the New Zealand party’s re-election in 1938, the TGWU’s 
journal remarked (under the headline ‘A Great Victory for Socialism’) that the result was a 
‘vote of confidence in Socialist administration and a mandate for a new instalment of bold 
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Socialist planning’. It was thereby ‘a lesson to the British people that prosperity can only be 
achieved by fundamental economic reconstruction’.60   
Dalton, writing of his 1938 trip, suggested that New Zealand’s government was 
currently ‘proving that Socialism and Social Reform are not alternative but complementary 
policies’ and in so doing were showing that ‘democracy, competently handled, can deliver 
the goods’. In addition, in iron and steel production, it was ‘creating a brand new Socialist 
industry’.61 Labour leader Clement Attlee, meanwhile, wrote in 1937 that within the last year 
there had taken place ‘the most interesting development in constitutional Socialism that we 
have yet seen’. He then outlined the various measures undertaken or planned by the New 
Zealand government, concluding that by the end of its first period of office the Dominion 
should be ‘well on the road to Socialism, without a vestige of dictatorship and with full 
democratic rights preserved’.62 And two years later, as some British financial institutions 
sought to curtail New Zealand’s expansive monetary policy, the City editor of the left-wing 
journal Tribune headlined an article: ‘Socialism Has Won in New Zealand: That is Why the 
City Plans a “Murder”’.63 
Beatrice Webb too was, initially at least, convinced that socialism was being built in 
New Zealand. In 1937 she recorded of her visitor Walter Nash that he was ‘finance minister 
in the first all-socialist government of New Zealand’. Two years later, Nash called again and 
Webb noted that, like the Scandinavian countries, New Zealand was ‘developing 
successfully, on the Fabian socialist principles of the inevitability of gradualness’. But 
without working the point through fully, she also observed that capitalists and landlords had 
been ‘swept on one side so far as political leadership is concerned’. The question of whether 
this actually constituted ‘socialism’ was one which would be brought to her attention in the 
near future. During the course of a conversation with her nephew in 1941, Webb suggested 
that New Zealand was ‘one of the only dominions to be democratic in her treatment of the 
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natives and also socialist in her internal organisation’. But her younger relative objected that 
in fact there ‘was very little socialism in New Zealand’. The Dominion, he acknowledged, 
had extensive social services. These were funded, however,  ‘not by socialist ownership of 
the means of production, but in taxation of the landlord and the capitalist’. Both were left to 
continue receiving rents and making profits in industry and agriculture’. To which Webb’s 
terse response was: ‘which is true’.64 It was an argument that prefigured the debates around 
Croslandite revisionism and Harold Wilson’s emphasis on promoting new means of 
production by nearly two decades.65 
Nonetheless, others continued to see the New Zealand’s Labour government as being 
in the process of creating a new society. The Fabian Joan Simeon Clarke, heavily involved in 
Labour’s social reconstruction planning, described the Dominion’s social policies in highly 
favourable terms in 1942. She contrasted, for instance, the French and Belgian family 
allowance schemes, which had been formulated with industry and were thus viewed with 
suspicion, with that of ‘New Zealand, a modern Socialist State’ where ‘children’s allowances 
are paid to children in right of childhood and of citizenship’.66 It was not only Labour’s own 
progress that seemed foreshadowed in the South Pacific: divides between socialist planners 
and social democrats were also clearly present, if in embryonic form. This was signaled in a 
particularly stark manner by the left-wing Labour intellectual and future Cabinet Minister 
Richard Crossman who wrote, in 1953 and thus after both British and New Zealand Labour’s 
exit from office, that British socialists had ‘seen, in Australia and New Zealand, what 







‘The Old World and the New Society’: Labour and the Commonwealth 
 
The transmission and acceptance of social welfare thinking from New Zealand to Britain was, 
as noted, strongly reinforced by contemporary views about Empire and Commonwealth. As 
Stefan Berger suggests, the Labour Party had during the imperial era ‘strong personal links to 
labour movements in the colonies, in particular to those of white settler societies’. So for 
instance Hugh Gaitskell, a rising star in the 1940s and soon to be Chancellor, ‘felt much 
closer to the Commonwealth countries than to continental European socialism’.68 This was 
also true of already-established figures such as Attlee, Bevin and Dalton. Dalton recorded 
that he had not only met with leading Labour figures during his visit in the late 1930s but had 
also ‘brought away a large quantity of official reports and political literature, and arranged for 
an improved scheme of interchange of documents and information between the British and 
New Zealand Labour Parties’.69 Dalton was also keen that the Dominions be fully apprised of 
the contemporary European situation and that their foreign policies should take this into 
account. He noted approvingly the robust line taken by Bill Jordan, New Zealand High 
Commissioner in London and his country’s representative on the Council of the League of 
Nations, over crises in China, Spain, and Ethiopia. And whatever government was in power, 
Dalton continued, New Zealand was ‘more ready than any other Dominion to help (Britain) if 
war comes’: he approvingly quoted Nash to this effect.70 
Bevin, later Labour’s Foreign Secretary, was likewise committed to the 
Commonwealth and especially to countries such as Australia and New Zealand because of 
their reform programmes.  In an address at Chatham House, the foreign policy research 
centre, on his impressions of the 1938 British Commonwealth Relations Conference Bevin 
raised the issue of ‘social progress’. Here he allowed that ‘tremendous differences of standard 
exist’ but still argued that in ‘Australia and New Zealand great progress has been made in 
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social services’.71 Early in 1939, a sub-committee of Labour’s National Executive Committee 
(NEC) received a letter from James Walker MP noting that he and Bevin, at a meeting with 
Labor colleagues in Australia, had suggested a conference of Commonwealth Labour Parties 
to be held in New Zealand in 1940 which would coincide with that country’s centenary 
celebrations. The idea was subsequently endorsed by the NEC, although of course the 
outbreak of war stalled these plans.72 During the war itself, Labour’s 1942 proposals for the 
post-war settlement noted approvingly that ‘our self-governing Dominions have already 
proved supremely how much more unbreakable are the links of freedom than the chains of 
slavery’.73 The title of this document, The Old World and the New Society, has strong echoes 
of comments such as those by Dalton on the contrast between Britain and its Pacific 
dominions, and indeed he played a prominent part in the origins of this statement.74  
Shortly afterwards a meeting of Commonwealth Labour Parties, held in London in 
September 1944, commented that in every Commonwealth country the labour movement was 
making advances. Note too was made of the ‘important achievements of the Labour 
Governments in New Zealand and Australia’ in the broader context of the construction of a 
‘new democratic world order’.75 Commenting on the meeting a few years later, G.D.H. Cole 
noted that it had been attended by representatives from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
South Africa and that, with victory in the war ‘well in sight’, delegates had pointed to ‘the 
great opportunities’ for the labour movement both in countries already liberated and for ‘the 
Movements in the British Commonwealth’. Cole placed this in the context not only of foreign 
affairs but also that of British Labour’s plans for post-war reconstruction.76 
Attlee, in his famously reticent autobiography, spoke warmly of leading 
Commonwealth figures including Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand between 1940 
and 1949. The two had worked together in the Independent Labour Party prior to Fraser’s 
departure for New Zealand where he ‘had come up the hard way’. A man apparently after 
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Attlee’s own heart, Fraser had ‘plenty of courage’ and was ‘always ready to do all he could to 
help the old country’. His idealism ‘was tempered by realism’ and he had ‘earned the 
affection and respect of his political opponents as well as of his supporters’.77 Attlee, while in 
government, did not hesitate to force New Zealand to write off some of Britain’s debts, 
restrict its dollar imports or indeed to devalue along with the UK in September 1949.78 But 
the idea of a social or policy partnership still continued to draw the two countries together. 
Around the same time, Rita Hinden, the Fabian and Labour Party authority on 
Commonwealth affairs, stressed the notion of ‘The Commonwealth Idea’ which in essence 
involved the ‘free association of peoples’, something which been formalized by way of 
Dominion status.79 Attlee invoked this idea in a speech in 1957. He described the emergence 
of the ‘white’ Dominions, contrasting the situation in New Zealand, ‘the most remarkable 
example of the absence of colour prejudice in the world’, with the situation in South Africa. 
Speaking of the voluntary nature of the Commonwealth, he clearly endorsed Fraser’s 
observation that Commonwealth membership was ‘independence plus, not independence 
minus’.80 Much of the perceived commonality between Britain and Dominions such as New 
Zealand, we argue, arose because of shared attitudes towards social issues and welfare reform 
and the willingness, on both sides, to learn from the other.  
 
‘A cold partisanship’: the political consequences of New Zealand’s progress 
 
More critical views of New Zealand’s social reforms gradually emerged, especially after the 
Second World War. New Zealand’s economy was very narrowly focused on farming, as its 
vulnerability to Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community demonstrated. 
Britain’s High Commissioner, Sir Francis Cumming-Bruce, noted in 1961: ‘New Zealand is 
still in essence a large farm supplying mainly the United Kingdom market, and a threat to this 
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market sends the whole country instinctively to panic stations’.81 New Zealand’s rurally-
based economy was matched by a perceived monochrome monotony in public life. There was 
no doubt that New Zealand was an extremely developed democracy with a high degree of 
personal freedom: contemporary indices of ‘democratic performance’ judged it very 
favourably. But some still perceived the Dominion as politically dull and uninspiring – even 
while its reforming social efforts drew praise – characterized by a practical, non-partisan 
sterility that was very similar to that mobilized when analysing the country’s intellectual 
life.82  
New Zealand politics could appear stiflingly consensual, with little apparent 
difference between the main parties. One study of the 1960 General Election, by a team of 
political scientists from the Universities of Auckland and Otago, explained this narrow range 
of politics as a consequence of New Zealand’s short history. The National Party, while 
broadly on the political right, had few long-established institutions to defend, and was deeply 
indebted to consensual modes of governance and social protection alike. Labour’s demands, 
meanwhile, had been largely met as an emergency response to the crisis of the 1930s. Both 
parties seemed to offer a different mix of price controls, export support and industrial peace, 
helping to account for very high rates of voter turnout due to ‘the somewhat practical nature 
of New Zealand politics’.83  
State institutions often seemed ill-equipped to meet new challenges. Lipson thought 
that such a directed, intimate and interconnected democracy presented its own demands: 
‘centralization has proceeded apace and without appreciable hindrance… the central 
government employs an administrative system and adheres to a departmental structure that 
are outmoded in many vital respects’. Meanwhile, however, ‘Ministers personally intervene 
far too much in the details of administration’.84 He characterized New Zealand’s institutions 
as natural for a small and new state, ‘a mechanism powerfully built and streamlined in design 
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to execute the people’s will’, without an executive head of state or a strong upper house of 
the legislature to restrain the government (New Zealand’s Legislative Council was actually 
abolished in 1950). The fact that elections every three years attracted turnouts of over ninety 
per cent suggested that New Zealanders saw the state as an extension of themselves: ‘when it 
acts, they feel that they are acting’. The state itself appeared like ‘a utilitarian instrument for 
effecting their will’. Political controversy and upheaval seemed alien.85  
Austin Mitchell, later a British Labour MP but between 1959 and 1963 a history 
lecturer at the University of Otago, predicted in his 1969 survey of the country that such 
stasis would prove very costly. ‘New Zealand’, he wrote, was ‘neither the nearest approach to 
the perfection of direct democracy nor a land without problems’. The latter might be less 
pressing than in some other countries, but they existed nonetheless and derived from the 
country being ‘the world’s most stable democracy’ which made it difficult to embrace 
change. The inter-war Labour Party had a defined programme and a sense of where it wanted 
to go, but more recent difficulties had been met, Mitchell concluded, in a ‘haphazard and un-
coordinated way’. Those societies which had successfully faced the demands of the 1960s 
had ‘a sense of purpose and direction’. Even in Britain’s ‘floundering response to current 
difficulties’ some new ideas could be discerned. New Zealand, by contrast, was drifting 
aimlessly and ‘threatened with being left behind in an increasingly competitive and 
unfamiliar world. Worse: it is threatened with not realizing that this is going on’.86  
From a slightly different angle, Goldblatt argued that in New Zealand ‘the nice 
arguments of the Latin races give way to a cold partisanship evinced only at the polling 
booth’ – that the ‘hot’ or ‘passionate’ politics of continental Europe, and the great class blocs 
of British politics, had been superseded in New Zealand by managerial inertia. There might 
be occasional protests between elections, but these were ‘without vehemence’. Parliament 
went through the necessary motions with government proposing measures and the opposition 
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criticizing but ‘eventually a compromise… evolved’. When a crisis occurred it was dealt with 
rapidly, effectively, and generally without controversy. But all this, Goldblatt felt, held back 
self-expression and policy innovation. Politics was essentially parochial and on both sides 
expediency triumphed over ‘individual self-expression. Philosophy is drowned in a flood of 
policy, personality submerged in well-being’.87  
Lipson, meanwhile, had fears about both undesirable conventionality, and a lack of 
constitutional checks and balances on state power. Individualism was limited enough by what 
he saw as New Zealand’s lack of emphasis on talent and effort, draining away citizens’ desire 
to display their full talents – a theme he took up in his classic 1948 work The Politics of 
Equality. Related to this conformity, and to some extent its corollary, was the fact that for 
Lipson New Zealand’s state apparatus was like a ‘high-powered automobile with a chauffeur 
in the driving seat and the owners sitting behind. Once the car has gathered pace, the owners’ 
safety depends upon the chauffeur’s skill. Democracy’s problem is to ensure that the 
chauffeur will follow orders from the back seat’.88 Until the introduction of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner of Administration or ‘Ombudsman’ by the new National Government in 1962, 
the wide discretionary powers of Ministers and administrative tribunals were subject to little 
constraint, particularly as it was very hard to obstruct them in the courts.89  
The appointment of an Ombudsman is a good example of the two-way traffic in ideas 
between Britain and New Zealand. John Robson, one of New Zealand’s most powerful civil 
servants (and encountered earlier in the context of promoting Beveridge’s ideas on 
voluntarism), championed this originally Scandinavian idea inside the Ministry of Justice in 
the early 1960s.  Robson had in turn been influenced by Beveridge himself, who during his 
1948 tour had stressed the need to strike a balance between state action, voluntarism and the 
rights of the individual. New Zealand’s status as an English-speaking common law country 
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had then smoothed the passage of an Ombudsman into British law (in 1965) once Labour 
returned to power in the UK.90 
 
Equality as ‘national fetish’? 
 
New Zealand’s cultural life presented a similarly mixed picture to the outside world, and so 
embodies the complexity of perceptions of the Dominion. Labour, as part of its own reform 
package, had made secondary education free and compulsory in the 1930s, with Fraser 
declaring that everyone ‘has a right, as a citizen, to a free education of the kind for which he 
is best suited and to the fullest extent of his powers’.91 Many more pupils stayed on at school 
to the age of sixteen, and then went on to tertiary institutions, than in Britain. But a booming 
birth rate (which more than doubled between the early 1930s and the mid-1950s) helped to 
cause an accommodation crisis and a chronic shortage of teachers.92 This made class sizes, 
both at primary and secondary level, a much more acute problem than in the UK.93 
But though New Zealand’s education system was, for the most part, highly efficient – 
and praised as such – observers suggested there were more qualitative and deep-seated 
problems. Some remarked there was not enough emphasis on the arts and humanities to 
stimulate any sort of intellectual debate. The New Zealand economist William Ball Sutch 
blamed his country’s schools and universities for Labour’s failure to rejuvenate its ideas after 
the 1930s, and for the National Party’s appeal to a mythical and ‘backward’ past.94 ‘Orphans 
in a sea of materialism’, Goldblatt called the country’s academic efforts outside the practical 
sciences. According to Goldblatt, the century of European settlement had seen New Zealand 
‘busy in chores, too preoccupied with “coping” to give birth in so short a time to an 
appreciation of the fine arts and the detachment and balance that speculation in the abstract 
demands’.95 Some British Parliamentarians found New Zealand ‘conformist’, a phenomenon 
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in part ‘due to its isolation’, but also linked to its development as ‘a one-class society’. One 
Labour Peer (Viscount Samuel) described New Zealand thus: ‘[as] the Welfare State par 
excellence, with a very high standard of living, with few millionaires and few down-and-outs, 
the country tends to become not only conservative but dull’.96  
Such observers were condescending, even patronizing about New Zealand’s cultural 
endeavours. The British philosopher D.D. Raphael, Professor at the University of Otago 
between 1946 and 1948, thought that many New Zealand writers had ‘an excessive concern 
with society’, a ‘one-track mind’. He did concede that ‘it is generally recognized that New 
Zealand culture does not reach a very high standard by comparison with European countries’ 
such culture as there was had a ‘wider spread than… in England’. Nonetheless, the 
Dominion’s ‘isolation and small population’ limited what could be achieved.97 He appeared 
unaware that New Zealand’s art scene was, for instance, benefitting at this point from the 
incorporation of ‘modern art’ in the primary school curriculum in the 1940s. Artists such as 
Colin McCahon and Ralph Hotere were innovative, striking and influential.98 Raphael was 
not alone in his notion of New Zealand’s cultural backwardness. James and Margaret Rowe 
made a familiar point when they noted, in the late 1960s, that ‘cultural activities have tended 
to be largely peripheral’ and where they did flourish it was because a ‘small body of 
dedicated, often very talented amateurs…have enthusiastically promoted a discipline in the 
face of discouraging lack of interest’.99   
To some of those mid-twentieth century Britons who chose to comment, New Zealand 
could sometimes seem rather simple, even Spartan – rather uniform and devoid of some of 
life’s pleasures. Such supposed defects were a long-running source of comment. New 
Zealander expatriates who had risen up the British class hierarchy could be dismissive of 
New Zealand’s supposed anti-intellectualism, with Oxford-based novelist Dan Davin 
regarding his compatriots as people who ‘go three times to Gone with the Wind, argue about 
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football matches and talk about motor-car gears’.100 The local cuisine too was often the 
subject of negative comments. Visiting Scottish writer Eric Linklater, thought that New 
Zealanders ‘spend their ingenuity, exhaust their interest, on cakes and pastries and 
ebullient…cream sponges’. But soup was ‘neglected’ and ‘meat mishandled’. Although 
world-famous for its sheep production, Linklater claimed to ‘have seen their admirable 
mutton brought upon the table in such miserable shape’ that it looked as if it had been ‘killed 
by a bomb, and the fragments of its carcase incinerated in the resultant fire’. One fish 
restaurant waitress told him: ‘I wouldn’t recommend a thing. I never touch their fish’.101 
Outside commentators still persistently commented on the country’s commitment to 
equality as ‘the cardinal principle of New Zealand life… a national fetish, often operating in 
[an]… indiscriminate way’.102 This had been a key part of New Zealand’s own self-image 
since the late nineteenth century and the face the country chose to show to the world.  The 
New Zealand Encyclopedia, approved by the second Labour Government in 1959 and 
published in 1966, both reflected and projected the idea that egalitarianism was at the heart of 
Dominion life.103 For New Zealanders, Lipson had already concluded, ‘equality comes first, 
and it is within its content that liberty has been redefined’.104  
 
Conclusions: the burden and fragility of equality 
 
Once Britain withdrew its Imperial patronage, and the protection New Zealand’s trade had 
long enjoyed, the outcomes proved very harsh. After the UK joined the European Economic 
Community in 1973, and at the time of the first oil price shock, New Zealand’s balance of 
payments deteriorated while inflation rose, and the economy shrank (on a per capita basis) 
for six consecutive years. Very high public spending and interventionist schemes under Prime 
Minister Muldoon’s ‘Think Big’ programme failed to remedy the situation. Labour, returning 
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to power in 1984, removed capital controls, floated the currency and sold off large parts of 
the extensive public sector, for example telecommunications, though retaining much of the 
country’s commitment to income equality via the tax system. These changes were, as 
Michael O’Brien has noted, ‘both extensive and rapid’. More than this, though, they 
fundamentally changed the nature of New Zealand’s social bargain between labour and 
capital, and the entire basis of its collective national life. The reasons for such a startling 
change of direction are complex, but their effects can be summed up as a shift from statist 
and Keynesian modes to the more liberal framework that was already taking hold in the 
UK.105 
Despite semi-serious though prolonged doubts about New Zealand’s narrowly-drawn 
economy and apparently staid intellectual and political life, between the election of New 
Zealand’s first Labour government in 1935 and the advent of the UK’s Thatcher 
administration in 1979 New Zealand had represented a stimulating exemplar to British 
policymakers. New Zealand represented the possibilities and limits of social reform in a 
similar English-speaking and common law country. The traffic in ideas did continue after the 
early 1980s, in all directions, as it had since the nineteenth centuries – though now it seemed 
that the flow of new policy proposals ran more towards New Zealand, particularly from the 
USA, than the other way around.106 
New Zealand’s beauty, but also the fragility of its many successes, had long been 
clear for all to see. As Bruce Mason in the late 1950s famously ended his famous paean to 
long-remembered schooldays, The End of the Golden Weather, prefiguring the inevitable 
demise of this uncomplicated vision of plenty, ‘the pohutukawa flowers sag and drop away, 
the hard clear light of summer yellows and wavers; there is more and more sand between the 
bathers on the beach’.107 If New Zealand was still a social laboratory, the sort of experiments 
it was carrying out in the late twentieth century were a long way from those conducted by the 
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likes of Seddon and Nash. Its reputation for forward-thinking but practical dynamism 
dimmed accordingly on the political left, especially among those British opinion formers who 
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